This study problematises the theoretical dialectic between the rule of law as a formal legal principle, and democracy as a political value. Taking a fundamental legal approach, the paper builds a concept of a constitutionalization democratic rule of law, through which it is possible to overcome the constant tension in democracy between the authority of the majority in deciding the law, and individual rights and freedoms. It concludes that the rule of law does not mean the rule of law over individual rights, and democracy does not mean the rule of the majority only, but that respect for individual rights and granting them a constitutional value are a prerequisite for constitutionalizing the principle of a democratic rule of law. However, the application of this principle, in practice, will be linked to the role of the constitutional judge in reconciling, through constitutional oversight, the power of the majority, which is embodied in the principle of the rule of law, and constitutional rights, which are the essence of the democratic principle.